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Huygens on Inertial Structure
and Relativity
Marius Stan*y
I explain and assess here Huygens’s concept of relative motion. I show that it allows him
to ground most of the Law of Inertia and also to explain rotation. Thereby his concept
obviates the need for Newton’s absolute space. Thus, his account is a powerful foun-
dation for mechanics, although not without some tension.
1. Introduction. While Huygens’s exegetes, few as they are, agree that his
mechanical foundations are profound and important, their consensus still
relies too much on hagiographic pieties instead of facts. It is because their
evidential basis was always partial and now is badly outdated. Predictably,
this drawback has allowed some to doubt Huygens’s depth of insight
ðEarman 1989, 70Þ.
I set out here to redress these defects by way of a new account of his
doctrine of relative motion and its role in grounding mechanics. For that, I
draw on Codex Huygens 7A, a complete record of his extant thoughts on
relativity.1 And, I rely on two hermeneutic principles. One is Contextualism:
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1. The Codex is a set of fragments in Latin and French, many on the nature of motion.
They range in date from 1686 to about 1694. Huygens wrote them as drafts of a long
preface to a tract in mechanics that he died without writing. I cite them by fragment and
section ðe.g., 9.aÞ from the critical edition in Mormino ð1993Þ and Huygens’s Oeuvres
complètes ð1888–1950Þ by volume and page number, e.g., 16:461. All translations are
mine. So is all emphasis in citations.
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explaining an author’s view from the science of her time, her aims, and in
terms available then—not from the viewpoint of current physics. Garber
ð1992Þ and Friedman ð2013Þ have applied it, respectively, to Descartes and
Kant with splendid results, so I emulate them here. The other is Charity: if
an author of proven deep physical insight is silent on an elementary point,
she may be credited with it. Charity is justified prima facie, so the burden of
argument lies with its opponents. In general, we must keep in mind that
Codex 7A consists in unpublished notes, inchoate to various degrees. Even
so, the deep ideas they contain are well worth our attention.
First I elucidate Huygens’s term ‘relative motion’ and locate it in the tax-
onomy of early modern positions ðsecs. 3 and 4Þ. Then I explain its dual
grounding role for mechanics: it allows him to retrieve the correct empiri-
cal content of the Law of Inertia, minus chronometry, and to account for
the dynamically distinguished phenomena of rotation, by showing them to
be relative motions ðsecs. 5 and 6Þ. Flanking my account on either side are
critical engagements with previous interpretations.
2. The Received View. After Lange in 1886 piqued modern curiosity in
Huygens’s theory of motion, Stein made it part of a historiographical arc
bending toward the general theory of relativity. His interest was in Huy-
gens’s view that motion is relative, which he construed as “ðabsoluteÞ
difference-of-velocities,” namely, of four-velocities in Newtonian space-
time. As this “remarkable insight” was beyond the expressive ken of early
modern terms, Stein excused as “paradoxical”Huygens’s official account of
relativity ð1977, 7–10Þ.
Earman too saw in Huygens a contributor to the long debate on absolute
and relative motion. As a first step toward resolution, Earman explicated
‘relative’ as the conjunction of two theses. R1: All motion is the relative
motion of bodies. R2: Spatial and temporal relations among bodies and
events are direct. He took Huygens to subscribe to both but remained wary
of Stein’s laudatory account of Huygens on relativity ðEarman 1989, 12,
42–43, 67ff.Þ.
In the same decade, Barbour praised Huygens for “looking forward to
Einstein” and for his success in “separating absolutely cleanly two compo-
nents” of motion, inertial and accelerated. Still, Barbour complained, Huy-
gens remained “quietly discreet” about the first component, in that he failed
to explain “with respect to what” inertial paths are straight lines ð2001, 495,
675; his italicsÞ.
These influential readings suffer from some common defects. First, they
are too cursory to do justice to Huygens’s full, considered view—whose
rich sophistication they miss, working as they do with partial, selective
evidence. Second, their key premise is flawed: allegedly, the problem is
whether motion is absolute or relative. But they leave ‘absolute’ undefined,
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use ‘relative’ equivocally, and fail to show that their problem was Huy-
gens’s too. Third, their methodology is suspect: often they refuse to take
Huygens at face value, opting instead to inflict on him the anachronistic
vocabulary of differential geometry. My interpretation avoids these short-
comings—to what extent, I try to judge in section 7.
3. Motion: True, Absolute, Relative. Huygens’s interpreters and histori-
cally minded philosophers of physics share the presumption that his basic
problem was whether motion is absolute or relative. Thinking that the
question is univocal, they expect it to have a clear answer. But, they miss
that ‘absolute’ and ‘relative’ were equivocal in early modern times, so they
need careful disentangling or else the problem of motion is not well posed.
Here is an attempt.2
In one sense, ‘absolute motion’ was just a synonym for the equivalent
phrases, ‘real’, ‘proper’, ‘physical’, and ‘true motion’. Hence, ‘motion is ab-
solute’ was the thesis that any body has a true 5 real 5 proper 5 physical
motion or rest, expressed by a determinate quantity—a privileged velocity—
and that there is a fact about whether the bodymoves or rests. Thus, motion is
a complete predicate, not an irreducible relation. Call this view Completism.
In another sense, ‘absolute’ denoted an explanatory commitment. ‘Mo-
tion is absolute’ meant that true motion consists in change of place in abso-
lute space. Call this view Absolutism.
‘Relative’ was so ambiguous that it shows up in incompatible views. In
one sense, it denoted an explanatory commitment. ‘Motion is relative’
meant that true motion consists in kinematic change—actual or just latent—
relative to some preferred material frame: the earth, the stars, the body’s
material envelope, the mass center of interaction, and so on. Call this view
T-Relationism.3
In another sense, ‘relative motion’ signaled the denial of Completism.
Thus, ‘motion is relative’ meant that bodies have no true 5 absolute 5
proper 5 real motions. Call this view Relativism.
The entailment relations between these views are as follows. Absolut-
ism and T-Relationism are contrary explanations of Completism. Relativ-
ism is the negation of Completism and entails that both Absolutism and
T-Relationism are false. Ergo, T-Relationism and Relativism are logically
incompatible—a crucial reason to be careful about what early modern fig-
ures, especially Huygens, mean by ‘relative motion’. Now for some direct
evidence.
2. I build here on an insight from Rynasiewicz ð2000Þ, which I regard as fundamentally
correct.
3. I thank Nick Huggett for this helpful suggestion.
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Completism was the view of a heavy majority and the default position in
astronomy. Riccioli, the last doyen of the Ptolemaic ancien régime, reveals
in Almagestum novum that both sides in the Copernican debate shared it:
In the Ptolemaic system, because the motion of the superior ½planets is
hampered by the Epicycles . . . sometimes they truly ½reipsa do not move at
all, as far as their true motion ½motum verum under the Fixed stars is
concerned—but appear to stay still ½stare videntur; whereas sometimes
they retrogress westward. However, in the Copernican hypothesis this
Phenomenon is just an appearance ½apparentia, resulting not from the
object itself, i.e. from the real motion ½motus realis of the Planets, but from
the translation of our eyes together with the Earth. ðRiccioli 1651, 302Þ
Ismael Boulliau also conceded Completism: “We judge rest to be true as
well as apparent” ð1645, 101Þ. Likewise, a renegade Copernican: “I grant
that, to our eyes, it appears that the Earth rests and the Sun moves in the
sky. However, in reality ½revera this is not so” ðLansberg 1651, prefaceÞ.
Horrocks as well: “½Copernicus infers correctly that the places of the Fixed
stars, which are in fact unmoved ½revera, only seem to the eye and the
imagination to lag behind ½the Zodiac. Kepler assents to this view. Lans-
berg too was once of the right opinion in this matter—i.e. that the fixed stars
really are fixed ½re immotas, as their name would have it. Later he changed
his mind, attributing to the stars a very slow motion” ð1678, 54Þ. Gassendi
too: “for the Stars to appear to travel westward, it matters not if they do
move that way in reality ½reipsa or it is the spectator’s eye that travels
eastward with the Earth. The Stars will appear to move west in either case”
ð1675, 135Þ.
Completism was also the view of most theorists of mechanics then.
Opponents and defenders of the new ‘mechanical philosophy’ granted it
alike. “To move and to not move are contradictory predicates, which is
plain. So, by ½my Axiom 1, they cannot both be in ½a subject at the same
time,” argues Honoré Fabri, an eclectic ð1646, 12Þ. Wren assumes Com-
pletism as he sets out to derive the laws of impact. When two bodies col-
lide, their “Velocities proper and most Natural are inversely proportional to
the Bodies,” he asserts ðWren 1668, 867Þ. Mariotte too, in 1679: “The rela-
tive speed of two bodies is that whereby they approach or recede from one
another, no matter what their proper velocities may be” ð1740, 3Þ. Newton
endorsed Completism even before the Principia: “½A body’s centrifugal
endeavor is always certain and determinate; which proves ½arguit that there
is some certain and determinate quantity of real motion in single bodies
½motus realis in singulis corporibus, a motion wholly independent from
relations to other bodies, which are as innumerable as the relative motions
they constitute” ð1684–85, 25rÞ. Huygens in 1694 tells Leibniz, “I saw you
believe that ‘it is absurd to think there is no real motion but only relative.’”
Leibniz agreed: “motion, or rather the moving force of bodies . . . must
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have a subject” ðHuygens 1888–1950, 10:606, 639Þ. Leibniz then admitted
to Clarke, “I grant there is a difference between an absolute true motion of
a body, and a mere relative change of its situation with respect to another
body” ðAlexander 1970, 74Þ. So, bodies have unique true, or real, or ‘ab-
solute’, motions whereby they either move truly or rest but not both.
Endorsing Completism comes with the attendant duty to explain the na-
ture of true motion. In response, some reached for Absolutism, claiming
that true motion consists in motion in Absolute Space. Borelli preceded
Newton by 2 decades, in a tract on collision mechanics: “Local motion
occurs either from one place of world space to another; or in the relative
space of some container. The former shall be called real and physical mo-
tion ½motus realis & physicus, and the latter relative motion ½motus rela-
tivus, though often it does not involve a change of position in the place,
or the space, of the world” ðBorelli 1667, 2Þ. Newton too argued, “true mo-
tion does not consist at all ½minime consistit in relations to other bodies.”
So, it “cannot be defined ½definiri except in terms of immobile places,” the
parts of Absolute Space ðNewton 1687, 8Þ. Euler then rediscovered inde-
pendently part of Newton’s case for Absolutism and concluded, “If a body
occupies successively one part of this immense space after another, it moves;
but if it persists continually in the same place, it rests” ð1736, 2Þ.
T-Relationism was famously Descartes’s doctrine. Any body has a mo-
tion or rest “in the proper sense,” he asserted, “in accordance with the truth
of the matter ½ex rei veritate.” Allegedly, it consists in the body’s trans-
ference “from the vicinity of the bodies that touch it immediately, and are
regarded as at rest, to the vicinity of other bodies” ðDescartes 1644, 46Þ.
A century later, Emilie du Châtelet likewise espoused T-Relationism, in a
peculiar version. “Absolute motion is a Body’s successive relation to other
Bodies, regarded as immobile, and that is its realmotion properly so-called”
ð1740, 215Þ.
Relativism was then by far the least popular position. The young Leibniz
asserted it: “Concerning motion I have shown elsewhere that it is not
possible to determine which subject it is in,” he wrote circa 1678 in a note
ð2001, 257Þ. But, he kept it private, and once he discovered “force,” he
seems to have abandoned it in favor of T-Relationism.
4. Huygens on Relative Motion. Huygens in Codex 7A insists at length
that all motion is relative. With the four views above as backdrop, we must
ask, what is the real content of his claim? Did he endorse T-Relationism or
Relativism? Recall that they are logical contraries, so it is crucial to estab-
lish which of these two his considered view was.
Huygens denied Absolutism vehemently, which has led many to think his
target was Newton’s absolute space. But, that misses the point: what Huy-
gens rejected is really Completism. “We cannot conceive in any way what
the true and simple motion of a single entire body is—nor does it differ
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from the state of rest of the same body” ð9.24rÞ. And also, “Mariotte dis-
tinguishes the relative celerity of two bodies from their ‘proper’ celerities. I
claim there is no proper celerity” ð10.aÞ. By turns, he asserts that true mo-
tion is nonexistent, empirically inaccessible, and superfluous for mechanics:
Indeed, if we look carefully into the nature of motion, we shall find that
this true motion and rest, as nearly all of them understand it, not only
cannot be known, but does not exist at all in the universe. ð7Þ
½We cannot ascertain at all the quantity of that true motion they
imagine for themselves. This quantity, in fact, they cannot state. ð1.bÞ
In vain does one ask what this true motion is—for what good is it? It is
the usefulness and consequences of our principle—namely, that motion is
only relative—that are the marks of its worth. ð6.iÞ
In sum, Huygens denied true motion, so his view was Relativism—the the-
sis that motion has no subject, so it is an irreducible relation, not a prop-
erty of single bodies, and that bodies have no privileged velocities. Ergo,
his real target was Completism. A passage in a late letter to Leibniz con-
firms it. Huygens there says that Leibniz believes, “when several bodies
move relative to each other, each has a certain true degree of motion or
force, in which I disagree with you” ð1888–1950, 10:646Þ.
Granted, this looks unimpressive. All we have seen fromHuygens so far is
blanket denials and irked denunciation. The real philosophical value of his
notes, I submit, is in their ability to cope with the two hardest problems for
Relativism: giving an account of inertial frames and explaining how rotation
is relativemotion. It is to these that I turn next, to show thatHuygens succeeds.
Before I do so, I introduce some definitions, to make his thought fully
clear. A-MOTION: actual change of relative distance over time between two or
more particles. L-MOTION: actual rest between rigidly connected particles but
actual motion if the constraints were removed. Its correlate is L-REST: actual
rest over time between the parts of a rigidly constrained system, if the
constraints were removed. ð‘A’ stands for ‘actual’ and ‘L’ for ‘latent’.Þ
H-FRAME: a set of four noncoplanar particles kinematically unconstrained,
mutually at rest over time, and unaccelerated. C-FRAME: a rigid body or set of
particles with rigid constraints. ABSOLUTE SPACE: an enduring rigid, immo-
bile, infinite frame ontologically distinct frommatter. I take their geometry to
be Euclidean.
5. Inertial Structure. A body counts as accelerated in manifold countless
ways, depending on the standard to which we refer its motion. However, in
classical theory only some accelerations are objective, that is, correlate
invariably with mechanical verae causae as their kinematic effects. Spe-
cifically, objective accelerations are changes—in speed, direction, or both—
from inertial trajectories. Hence, to secure objectivity for his mechanics
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Huygens must explain which relative motions count as inertial paths, so that
objective accelerations can be defined from them, and so begin to point us to
their underlying causes.
Not until the late 1680s did Huygens feel the force of this question. When
he finally does, he puts it as the task of explaining what it is for bodies
to move in a straight line—and in different directions.4 That explanation, in
turn, would allow him to give objective empirical meaning to forced mo-
tion—specifically, change of speed of rectilinear translation or deflection
from inertial paths. To that end, Huygens introduces a technical notion,
namely, “bodies at mutual rest” ðcorpora inter se quiescentiaÞ. I explicate
it next, and then I examine its epistemology.
Constitution. “Bodies at mutual rest” are any two or more solids satis-
fying two conditions. First, the bodies must be kinematically free. Huygens
means it as a blanket imposition, unrestricted to specific physical constraints
like rigid rods, flexible lines, or immobile surfaces. His bodies must be “not
tied together,”must be situated “where nothing can impede theirmotion” and
be “entirely free to move,” namely, move “separately and in no way bound
or joined together” or “kept together by any bond or obstacle” ð6.a, 12.33r,
11.d, 7.19rÞ. They must be generally unconstrained.
Second, they must “keep the same situation and distance relative to each
other” over time ð7.19rÞ. This is really two conditions. The mass centers of
the constituent bodies must keep their relative distances. And, the masses
themselves must not spin around internal axes. In Huygens’s words, “those
bodies are at rest relative to each other that, not being held together by any
bond or fastening bar, keep the same relative distance, both as a whole and
with their parts” ð8.bÞ.
Do these masses accelerate? If they do, then Huygens is mistaken in
resting the Law of Inertia on them. Four arguments collectively imply that
“bodies at mutual rest” are nonaccelerating. Before we see why, keep in
mind that only contact action—the “true and sound Philosophy,” as he
called it—is legitimate in Huygens’s mechanics: from collision and vortex
pressure. One argument is from silence: in general, Huygens says so if he
takes bodies to be colliding.5 But, he never says of “bodies at mutual rest”
4. Nowadays arc-length straight lines are said to be the paths of force-free bodies. But,
Huygens’s mechanics is not a theory of ðNewtonianÞ impressed forces. So, I use the
phrase ‘force-free’ to denote bodies that are noncolliding or on which ether pressure is
balanced by some mechanical agency.
5. For example, “If we make two bodies collide that were previously moving, together
with us, with a common uniform motion, after the impact these two bodies will re-
bound or move together relative to us ðwho are being carried with the same common
motionÞ in no way differently than if that motion adventitious to all were lacking
entirely” ð7.15rÞ.
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that they collide; hence, they do not accelerate by that mechanism. Another
argument is that Huygens meant these body sets to underwrite the various
‘lab frames’ of his impact mechanics: the river bank, the boat floating on it,
as experiments with colliding bodies unfold inside, and so on. But, he takes
his lab frames to be at rest or in uniform translation relative to one another,
never accelerated.6 Yet another argument is from Charity: were “bodies at
mutual rest” accelerated, Huygens’s basic dynamical laws would be evi-
dently false, and he is too perceptive not to have seen that.7 So, he took them
to be nonaccelerated.
In fact, “bodies at mutual rest” are unaccelerated. The only sources of
momentum transfer in Huygens’s mechanics are collisions and ether pres-
sure. Ether vortices induce central acceleration fields, which would disturb
the mutual rest of free bodies, thus violating the defining condition—
although vortices themselves can be relatively stationary and will remain
so.8 Objection: bodies remain at mutual rest even as they receive equal and
parallel accelerations. Answer: that scenario is disallowed by Huygens’s
impact mechanics.9 An accelerated stream dragging along—by collision—a
set G of stationary bodies will disturb their mutual rest, save in two cases,
and both can be ruled out. One is to require that G’s members have equal
masses, congruent shapes, and parallel placements in the stream, but of course
Huygens does not allow such arbitrary restrictions. His account is fully gen-
eral, not meant to depend on good luck. The other is a physical impossi-
6. For example, “If I inquire if, on a boat moving uniformly, the impact and rebound of
bodies will occur in the same way as on a boat at rest—to be sure, in each case I
understand ‘to move’ and ‘to be at rest’ relative to the earth and the riverbank” ð1.bÞ.
7. Relative to a set H of ðsmoothlyÞ accelerating ‘bodies at mutual rest’, a force-free
test body will appear in free fall or projectile motion, depending on the accelerations on
H. These paths are just what Galileo and Torricelli had treated, in 1638 and 1644,
respectively. Huygens was by far the subtlest reader of Galileo and Torricelli. Charity
dictates that we give him this: if H accelerates, force-free bodies trivially fail the Law of
Inertia relative to it.
8. In modern terms, a Descartes-Huygens vortex is a ‘hard shell’ attractive potential. At
cosmic scales, vortex centers are outside each other’s ‘shell’, so they remain at mutual
rest.
9. Although it is permitted in Newton’s theory, with action-at-a-distance gravity from a
field source at infinity—hence, the need for Newton’s Corollary Six to his laws of
motion. The ‘mechanical’ model of terrestrial gravity in Huygens’s 1690 Discours de la
cause de la pesanteur induces nearly parallel accelerations: the angles they make with
true parallels are negligible in practice, although not in theory. I leave out here whether
his notion can cope with universal gravitation. In the spirit of Contextualism, I restrict
my account to Huygens, who thought there was evidence against universal gravity
ðSchliesser and Smith, forthcomingÞ.
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bility: having single jets in the stream self-adjust their momentum to the
mass of the particular G-member they carry along, or else relative accelera-
tions arise to disturb mutual rest.10
And, they are nonrotating too, not just unaccelerated. For Huygens, it is
constitutive of rotation that particles “endeavor to recede from one another,
and strive to do so with all the more force as their relative motion is greater”
ðapp. II.173vÞ. In a set of unconstrained bodies, rotation would cause rel-
ative drift. The defining condition thus ensures that “bodies at mutual rest”
do not rotate.
And so, Huygens has taught how to set up an inertial frame, in which an
observer at rest sees all force-free bodies remain in uniform translation. That
was his intention all along:
If a body moves freely and without obstacle in respect to those bodies at
rest relative to each other, the moving body will run over a straight line
relative to them, and will be translated by a uniform motion. . . . From this
motion, referred to bodies at rest relative to each other, one can at last
understand and define ½definiri what it is to move freely ½libere and
uniformly ½aequabiliter in a straight line. . . . Assuming some bodies to be
at rest in regard to each other, many other bodies can move relative to them
along various straight lines, and so these lines will be called the various
directions of motion. ð7.19rÞ
Relative to ½free bodies at mutual rest, bodies in motion describe a
straight line, move uniformly and persevere in this state. This has the
status of a Principle. From it is to be understood what it is to move in a
straight line. On different directions. ð8.cÞ
Because ‘bodies at mutual rest’ are neither accelerated ðin ways allowed by
his mechanicsÞ nor rotating, it follows that for Huygens the Law of Inertia
is true relative to a preferred set of frames. Thus, his view is importantly
distinct from two modern conceptions: one that takes the Law to postulate
the existence of an inertial frame and one that regards it as defining the
frames suitable for mechanics.
Now I must make a friendly correction. His frames lack sufficient kine-
matic structure: they cannot identify motions univocally. The number of
“bodies at mutual rest” required for that task is four. But, Huygens allows
frames designated by just two or three bodies. That is enough for his im-
mediate aim—a mechanics of direct, particle collision—although not for a
10. By the Second Law, an accelerated stream of equal-momentum jets induce in un-
equal test bodies tidal forces, i.e., unequal accelerations, which disturb mutual rest. To
avoid this consequence, each jet must self-adjust its momentum to the individual mass
it strikes. I thank Katherine Brading for pressing me on this point.
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general theory of extended bodies. Fortunately, we can redress his short-
coming without much anachronism. Just decades later, Euler showed that,
to determine all positions—hence all possiblemotions—univocally, we need
no less than four noncoplanar points. So, he inferred, “if we know the dis-
tance of a pointO to four other points A, B, C,D not all in the same plane, its
position is determined completely” ðEuler 1765, 4Þ. Hereafter, I take “bodies
at mutual rest” to denote a set of four nonspinning solids. Then they count
as an H-frame as I defined it, so I will call them by that name.
Huygens now makes a crucial point. His H-frames may be at rest or
translating uniformly relative to one another, but none is ‘truly’ at rest or has
a true velocity. We may take any such frame as stationary, arbitrarily: there
is no fact to confirm or disprove our choice. For instance, suppose the stars
are an H-frame; “there is no reason why we should not say that the fixed
Stars are at rest among themselves, relative to each other. But then, apart
from this rest, we cannot ascribe to them any other rest one ought to call
true. The same argument applies to any other bodies, which obviously can
be said to be at rest only in respect to one or several other bodies—relative
to which they keep the same position and distance” ð7.17rÞ. Likewise,
suppose—as Huygens, following Kepler, once thought—that a comet trans-
lates uniformly in respect to the stars. “How are the stars any more at rest
than some comet traversing the skies in a straight line ðas Kepler showsÞ? For
the latter could be considered stationary just as much as the entire host of the
stars” ð3.aÞ. Thus, there is no distinguished standard of rest; all H-frames are
dynamically equivalent.
An evaluative point is in order here. Note that H-frames are compatible
with Newton’s Corollary Five. Suppose that J and K are two H-frames in
uniform translation relative to one another. Then every constituent particle
in J changes position toward K by the same amount in a given time. Hence,
the particles stay at rest inter se, so J remains an H-frame. Mutatis mutandis
for K in respect to J. Ergo, H-frames in relative uniform translation obey
Corollary Five: “A space being given, the motions of bodies in it are the
same among themselves ½inter se, whether the space rests or moves uni-
formly ahead without rotation” ðNewton 1687, 19Þ. More exactly, let two
systems S and T be individually closed and mechanically identical, that is,
have the same reference configuration and distribution of mass, internal
forces, torques, and stresses. Let S have the same placement and initial
velocities relative to J as T has relative to K. Then Newton’s laws entail that,
for all subsequent times, the placement and configuration of S in J will be
the same as that of T in K. And so, in effect Huygens could show that his
H-frames can secure as much inertial structure as Newton’s dynamics really
needs. From the dynamical laws in the Principia, Huygens’s ‘bodies at
mutual rest’ entail the same empirical content as Absolute Space. ðThey are
inertial frames, after all.Þ And, Huygens can do that without Newton’s two
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most contentious notions: true velocity, an empirically inaccessible quan-
tity, and Absolute Space itself, a philosophically divisive entity.
However, Huygens has no account of an inertial clock—no one then who
opposed absolute time had one. That makes his account of inertial frames
incomplete: he cannot give empirical meaning to the notion of crossing
equal distances in equal times. Set aside this ðadmittedly importantÞ lacuna
for a moment, and let us sum up the source of kinematic-inertial structure in
his highly nontrivial mechanics: it is the set of all H-frames, which are
Galilean and form an equivalence class. That supplants true velocity and
Absolute Space, he thinks.
Epistemology. So far Huygens has answered a conceptual question:
What is an inertial frame? This problem has an empirical correlate: Do any
exist? He realizes that maybe none exists after all: “Any free body is either
at rest or moves uniformly in respect to other bodies themselves at rest rel-
ative to each other, if they exist—or it would move so, if they existed” ð8.bÞ.
Now, suppose that an H-frame does exist. How might we establish that?
In Huygens’s mechanics, a conclusive answer would be to find four non-
constrained solids at mutual rest over time. Short of that, we must content
ourselves with considerations of greater or lesser plausibility. With that in
mind, Huygens thinks there is an excellent approximation of an H-frame:
“we know that the fixed stars are mutually at rest and have not received any
impulse to move round; for in that case they would recede from one an-
other.” But, the stars would recede “unless they are all embedded in a solid
sphere, as some used to believe in the past” ð11.gÞ. It was a highly implausible
supposition at the time ðrefuted in 1718 with Halley’s discovery that stars
have proper motionsÞ. Still, if true, it would disqualify the stars as a suit-
able frame, as Huygens freely admits. In conclusion, inertial frames exist to
the extent that his constitutive conditions—kinematic freedom and mutual
rest—obtain empirically and insofar as we may extend his doctrine to in-
clude the notion of an inertial clock.
6. Rotation. Given that he thinks there are no preferred velocities, Huygens
must explain how purely relative motion can cause dynamically distin-
guished centrifugal effects. He thinks he can: “Now I move on to circular
motion, to show that what they call true motion is not found here anymore
than in rectilinear motion but it too is relative” ð11.dÞ. Huygens responds in
two parts. He argues that rotation is relational, not a property, and is no true
motion; that is, single rotating bodies have no unique, preferred total ve-
locity. In effect, he aims to show that rotation is relativistic, so as to defeat
Completism at last.
He fulfills his task with mixed success. That is because a sharp look at his
results reveals not one but two accounts of what rotation is, and they differ
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in crucial respects. In the first, an H-frame is indispensably in the picture—
the motion is described relative to it. The second account lacks an H-frame,
and the motion is referred to the very parts of the rotating system; to an
inertial observer, the direction of this motion is radial.
The First Account. The fragmentary state of Huygens’s notes makes it
hard to tell what his official view of rotation was. The more frequently
stated—the soundest, too, and recognizably modern—is this analysis:
Circular motion is a relative motion along parallel straight lines, with the
direction changing continually while the distance remains the same be-
cause of the bond. Circular motion in one body is the relative motion of its
parts while the distance remains the same because of the bond. ð6.dÞ
Circular motion is that which takes place in respect to a point taken to
be at rest, while the mobile’s distance to it remains the same because of the
bond or obstacle, but with the direction changing constantly. The celerity
of a body ðor of some part of itÞ in respect to that point at rest is measured
from the bodies at rest relative to one another and to that point, taking into
account the time and the length of the circular path traversed ½amplitudo
circuitus. ð8.aÞ
And we can define the number and celerity of rotations in regard to
other bodies at rest relative to each other. ð7.19rÞ
Huygens’s epitome of rotation is spin, not orbital motion. He explains it
with two bodies rigidly connected revolving in a plane around their com-
mon mass center or a body spinning around an internal axis. For such set-
tings, I construe his words above as follows. A body rotates just in case its
parts rotate relative to an H-frame or set of ‘bodies at mutual rest’. Really,
they rotate in respect to an instantaneous axis at rest in an H-frame. And,
every part has a conatus, or endeavor to continue in a straight line defined
relative to the frame. That conatus has a direction and a size.11 Its direction
is tangential to the particle’s trajectory in the H-frame. That is clear by the
terms of the account so far and from figure 1, an improved rendition of Huy-
gens’s own drawing. Its size, or scalar value v, is proportional to the ‘cen-
trifugal force’ V, the particle’s endeavor to recede radially from the center
11. The direction is the line of its instantaneous endeavor: “This line along which a
body ðor any of its partsÞ moves—or wouldmove if it were free—we call the direction of
motion” ð8.20rÞ. Huygens knows that some dynamically relevant quantities of motion are
vectors, not scalars. For example, he grasps linear momentum clearly: “our principle
could be as follows: that as much motion must remain ½throughout the collision. But it
must be understood in the sense that as much motion remains in the same direction”
ð12.33rÞ.
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where r is scalar distance to C assumed stationary in some H-frame ð1728,
114Þ.
What makes it motion? Huygens really answers this twice. First, he claims
it is a ‘constant change in direction’. He means change in the direction of
conatus, the tangential velocity vector. For any two diametrically opposed
particles A and B in a rotating system, their conatuses are parallel and con-
trary ðagain, see fig. 1Þ. Over time, they remain so, but the direction in which
each particle points individually changes at every instant; the spin being
uniform, the change is constant. Huygens calls it the ‘direction changing
constantly’. Second, Huygens claims the particle moves in that it changes
position relative to the frame. In that sense, its motion is an arc-length dis-
placement. Thereby, his account grounds—rather incompletely, absent a no-
tionof inertial clocks—two importantmodernmeasuresof ðuniformÞ rotation:
angular speed and centripetal acceleration. In his words, they are amplitudo
circuitus and change of direction ‘in the first instant’.
The Second Account. Although embryonic, the analysis above is sound
and coheres with his notion of inertial frames. And yet, Huygens ended up
Figure 1. Rotation as ‘change of direction’. Two particles (one gray, one white) are
in rotation. Each is shown at two consecutive positions. The arrows are their tan-
gential velocity vectors.
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of two minds about rotation; a hard look at Codex 7A reveals another ac-
count. To soften up the reader, I begin with these declarations:
The relative celerity of bodies measured along lines of direction is one
thing, whereas celerity measured by the change in distance between the
bodies themselves ½inter se is another. ð8.aÞ
But can two bodies, whose mutual distance stays the same, move rel-
ative to each other? Certainly, when the increase in their distance is im-
peded. ð9.24rÞ
Maintaining a definite position among themselves is not a mark that
bodies are at rest relative to each other. ð11.cÞ
For if bodies are linked or held together, they can maintain their re-
ciprocal situation and yet be in motion relative to one another. . . . Thus,
½two constrained rotating bodies A and B will have a motion between
them, i.e. relative to each other, but without a change in position or dis-
tance between them. ð11.d–fÞ
I submit that Huygens means ‘relative motion’ here in a new sense, namely,
as L-motion as I defined in section 4. Two rigidly constrained particles move
relative to each other because they would increase their relative distance
actually, provided the constraint was dissolved. Huygens’s justification for
his unorthodox usage is that this kind of latent relative motion comes from
actual kinematic change—which becomes constrained—and it would turn
back into actual change, upon removing the constraint. To that end, he offers
a thought experiment ðsee fig. 2bÞ. Let two particles in uniform translation—
defined relative to an external H-frame—move in parallel but opposite direc-
tions. Let an inextensible string ð filumÞ with hooks at both ends lie in their
path normal to both trajectories. Let the particles collide with the string, and
so become hooked, at the same time. Thereby “the bodies’ rectilinear mo-
tion turns into circular motion, which the string . . . will reveal by the ten-
sion in it” ð6.jÞ. Before their capture, the particles have a mutual speed, or
rate of actual change in mutual distance; this mutual change is defined in
terms of each other, not relative to the H-frame. The closer they get to the
hooked line, the closer that speed gets to zero. And yet, they are still in
motion relative to each other: “the distance between them changes only a
very little—virtually not at all. The same thing happens in circular motion”
ð9.bÞ. Introducing the constraint does not destroy or annihilate that mutual
relation. Rather, it just suppresses it, or makes it latent. As proof, just cut the
string, thus restoring the particles’ kinematic freedom: their actual change
of mutual distance will resume. This shows that ðlatent relativeÞ L-motion
is well defined: suppose I come across two tethered bodies and cut the string
between them, and yet they keep their mutual distance. These bodies then
count as having been at L-rest before I removed the constraint. L-motion
thus has an empirically meaningful correlate, so it is itself meaningful.
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This L-motion is radial: if a rotating particle’s ‘endeavor to recede’ is
analyzed as L-motion, its direction is on the line between the corotating par-
ticles. It is the line of ‘mutual speed’ as Huygens defines it above and also the
line of the dynamical effects induced by this relative motion, for example,
tension, if we replaced the rigid constraintwith a spring or a strain gauge.12But
clearly, to all inertial observers the line is a diameter of the spinning system.
Although he never mentions Newton in this context, I think it is very
likely that Huygens devised this scenario in reply to Newton’s Gedanken-
12. Recall that for Huygens ‘centrifugal force’ is that which is balanced by the tension
in the cord keeping a body in orbit around a center. The tension is along the cord and so
is the ‘centrifugal force’ of rotation. He conceives ‘centrifugal force’ as an endeavor
intrinsic in the body, which has it just because it moves—not because an external
agency caused it to have. That ‘force’ drives a rotating body to move on the involute of
the ðcircularÞ path it has when seen from an inertial frame. As Stein puts it beautifully,
the involute “leaves the ½path at right angles” ð1977, 7Þ. But, that endeavor to move so
appears only to observers in a C-frame that rotates with the body. Inertial observers will
see the body strive to move along the local tangent to the trajectory, not normal to it.
Figure 2. a, Rotation as L-motion, relative to each other. Suppose they were
constrained by a rigid rod, which is then removed. The solid line is their relative
distance postremoval; it measures the ‘relative celerity’ as Huygens conceives it.
The dotted lines are their individual trajectories as seen from an inertial frame.
b, Rotation as relative motion. This is Huygens’s illustration of how rigid mutual rest
ensues by suppressing actual mutual-relative motion and would turn back into it if
we removed the rigid constraint. So, he infers, rigid rest can be relative L-motion.
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experiment of the two globes spinning in a vacuum. Huygens’s aim was
to generate an intuition: relative motion can be L-motion too, not just
A-motion. He needed it for his second account of rotation, which does not
rely on H-frames. Although less represented in Codex 7A than the first ac-
count, it is still there. Consider these passages:
Circular motion is the relative motion of the parts, hurled in opposite di-
rections but held together because of the bond, or connection. ð9.24rÞ
Yet the parts of a body can move relative to each other while the
distance between them remains the same, on account of some bond or
barrier; this is called rotation ½motus vertiginis. . . . In this motion, the
parts endeavor to recede from one another or from a point defined with
respect to them; and they strive to do so with all the more force as their
relative motion is greater. Likewise, it is from this force that we can judge
the quantity of this relative motion, seeing as we cannot do so from the
change of distance. ðApp. II.173vÞ
The view they entail is this. Rotation is a mutual relation between corotating
bodies or particles. They rotate just in case they tend to recede from each
other. And, they just tend to recede—the constraint prevents them from do-
ing so in fact.
Then what makes rotation in this sense a type of motion? After all, the
particle is at rest relative to its corotating siblings, because of the constraint.
I take Huygens to claim that rotation so analyzed is relative L-motion, that
is, just counterfactual change: although actually at rest, the particles would
increase their mutual distance upon removing the constraint, so they are in
latent motion.
As a species of motion, for every particle this L-motion has an instan-
taneous size and direction. The size is proportional to its ‘centrifugal force’.
The direction is that in which they would move if the constraint was dis-
solved. In a two-particle system, the direction is on the line between them.
That line is the only empirically meaningful direction in this account, be-
cause H-frames are absent by definition: “in the absence of those bodies ½at
mutual rest, from centrifugal force we know that the greater this relative
celerity, the greater the centrifugal force. From it, we can discover circular
motion,” Huygens claims ð8.aÞ. See also figure 2a, based on Huygens’s
sketch, showing two particles at three consecutive times, with the constraint
dissolved. Their relative motion is the increase in mutual distance ði.e., the
solid line between themÞ. Again, the increase is counterfactual—actual
mutual rest but latent change of mutual distance. Only by removing con-
straints would that latent motion become actual relative change.
Note a key fact: Huygens’s second account is in a rotating frame. Let an
observer O rest on the ‘line of mutual speed’ between the particles ði.e., the
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line of their L-motionÞ. To all inertial observers, O herself counts as rotat-
ing; thus, O and the rigidly connected particles make up a rotating C-frame.
In this description, the particles’ centrifugal force too is radial—it makes
them tend to recede along the radius from the center of spin. ðIn contrast, to
inertial observers the particles’ endeavor is along their respective tangents,
not the radius.Þ Ergo, for this analysis of rotation, the relevant frame is
noninertial: an unconstrained force-free body in it will describe a curve, not
a straight line, as Huygens knows too well. See figure 3, based on his De vi
centrifuga, showing the trajectory of a force-free body as seen by an ob-
server in a rotating C-frame. As Huygens proved, the path is a cycloid.
Call the first construal above ‘A’, the second ‘L’. The two accounts are
wholly distinct; to see that, juxtapose them in a nutshell:
A-ROTATION: a type of A-motion relative to a nonrotating H-frame. Actual
kinematic change in respect to an inertial frame. Its objective direction is
tangential to the trajectory.
L-ROTATION: a type of L-motion relative to a rotating C-frame. Nonactual,
latent kinematic change in respect to a noninertial frame. Its objective
direction is radial.
And yet, Huygens asserts both nearly in one breath. His keen, exquisite
physical insight makes it incredible that he missed their drastic differences.
Figure 3. Path of a zero-force body as seen from a rotating frame (uniformly counter-
clockwise).
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That he restated both in his notes attests to how exerted he was by Newton’s
two globes rotating in empty space.13
The other half of his case that rotation is relativistic argues that it is not true
motion. To assess it properly, wemust know its real target. Huygens subverts
a subthesis of Completism, that is, that truemotion is the “wholemotion” of a
body: its total velocity at some given instant and effective trajectory over
time. Newton had made that premise explicit in his third ‘argument from the
properties’ of true motion.Wemust posit immobile places, he had argued, to
vindicate the notion that bodies have “whole and absolute motions ½motus
integri et absoluti,” namely, true total velocities ðNewton 1687, 8Þ. Huygens
denies that bodies have ‘whole motions’. The apparent motion being given,
his theorems on centrifugal force let us compute a rotating body’s velocity
ðlinear or angularÞ relative to an axis C assumed stationary in an H-frame.
Now, this frame—hence a body rotating in it—could well have linear ve-
locities toward other H-frames. Those must be vector added to the body’s
rotation to compute its ‘whole motion’. But, by Newton’s Corollary V, no
mechanical experiment can detect ‘true’ linear velocities of one H-frame
relative to another. So, the ‘whole motion’ is incomputable, having empir-
ically inaccessible parts. “For even they grant that a spinning body, be it an
entire body or one made up of conjoined parts, can at the same time move
rectilinearly with amotion that carries all its parts. But they confess that there
is no mark whereby we can discern to what extent this rectilinear motion is
truemotion,” objects Huygens. Then rotation is not truemotion in that sense.
It is relativistic: “Without being able to say how much either ½corotating
body has of this motion commonly called true ½véritable, andwithout having
this sort of motion at all, for it is nothing but a chimera grounded in a false
idea” ð6.d, 11.gÞ.
My construal allows me now to solve a famous difficult puzzle about
Huygens. He says, “I had long believed that the kriterion of true motion lies
in circular motion. How I came to change my mind” ð5.eÞ. The puzzle is,
exactly in what respect did he change his mind? I propose an explanation.
The young Huygens used to think that rotation is evidence for Completism,
in that it is a fact about single bodies in true ðcircularÞ motion. However,
Huygens then had no view about the nature of true rotation: he endorsed
neither Absolutism nor T-Relationism. Some time between 1686 and 1691,
he found a way to analyze rotation as an irreducible relation—be it to an
13. A-rotation and L-rotation are logically compatible, but the latter is dynamically in-
adequate. The L-motion of two rotating particles is accelerated—remove the constraint,
and their mutual distance changes nonuniformly, which Huygens knows: “as they
recede ½from each other, their ½mutual celerity increases continuously” ð7.17rÞ. But
there is no real cause for their mutual acceleration. So, it counts as inertial ðL-Þmotion,
and yet it is not uniform.
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H-frame or to a corotating body—and so he realized it does not entail Com-
pletism after all. Rather, it supports Relativism.14
7. Hermeneutics. Ceteris paribus, my interpretation is preferable to Stein’s:
I have explained Huygens without anachronism, fully and in detail, and with
no need to ignore or dismiss his explicit assertions. Moreover, Stein and I
differ radically on the nature of rotation: his Huygens conceived it—in-
effably, we must believe—as a difference in the four-velocities of rotating
particles. I have shown from direct evidence that Huygens had two accounts.
Using different methods, we obtained distinct construals of his concept
‘relative motion’. I explained it as A-motion and L-motion, in terms avail-
able to Huygens; Stein, as a difference of space-time vectors, in terms that
Huygens could not have had. I agree with Stein that, among the early mod-
erns, Huygens rivals Newton in depth of insight into the foundations of clas-
sical particle mechanics. But, I went beyond him in explaining the material
resources Huygens uses to anchor that structure, that is, the notion of ‘bod-
ies at mutual rest’ and his two kinds of relative motion.
Critically, my reading allows me to absolve Huygens of two grave accu-
sations and to subvert two myths about him. The first charge comes from
Earman, who complained that Huygens “flatly contradicts himself.” Alleg-
edly, he did not refer rotation “to some reference body” and yet admitted that
rigid spin is eo ipso mutual rest, not relative motion, Earman claims ð1989,
71Þ. My evidence shows that his two claims are false, and so the charge is
untenable.
Barbour accused that there is a “serious contradiction at the heart of Huy-
gens’s doctrine,” which “seems to have escaped him completely.” Suppos-
edly, Huygens’s claim that motion is relative—which Barbour reads as, all
kinematic quantities are relativistic—contradicts his recognition that some
motions ði.e., inertial translationsÞ are privileged ð2001, 672–73Þ. As evi-
dence, Barbour pointed to Huygens saying, “a body’s motion could be truly
equable and, at the same time, truly accelerated, according as we refer it
to different other bodies” ð1888–1950, 6:327Þ. Unfortunately, Barbour mis-
read Huygens’s words. The real context of his claim is rotation. Consider the
white particle in figures 1 and 2. Analyzed as A-rotation ðrelative to an ex-
ternal H-frameÞ, its motion is uniform; analyzed as L-rotation ðrelative to its
corotating gray particleÞ, its motion is accelerated, as I explained at the end of
section 6. So, Huygens implies, the same phenomenon—spin—is both uni-
form and accelerated motion. Still, that is because Huygens has described
the same process in two kinds of frames. But, the Law of Inertia fails in
14. An alternative explanation: Huygens used to think rotation is motion in Absolute
Space but later came to see that it is relative to matter ðStein 1977, 10Þ. On the basis of
my evidence above, this must be false. Huygens never accepted Absolutism.
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the second kind. Then if we restrict ourselves to his preferred account ði.e.,
A-motion relative to some H-frameÞ, linear acceleration is objective and
invariant, not relativistic—and so is inertial motion. So, Huygens is innocent
of Barbour’s charge.15
The first myth, from Lange in the nineteenth century to Chareix in the
twenty-first, is that Huygens’s key problem was “is motion absolute or rel-
ative?” ðBarbour 2001, 478Þ. Now it is clear that they are mistaken. His real
question was whether bodies have true motions ði.e., preferred velocitiesÞ—
a view he subverted at length: “it seems greatly important to try and root out
this common error,” he proclaimed ð7.15vÞ.
A second myth: the Principia was the chief impetus behind Huygens’s
case for Relativism, which he allegedly articulated to answer Newton, with
Leibniz as a third interlocutor. My interpretation shows that this, too, is
false. Huygens had encountered Absolutism and rejected it out of hand al-
ready in the 1660s, well before the Principia. In those years William Neile
had pressed on him several arguments for the existence of motion in Ab-
solute Space, which Huygens in Codex 7A keeps refuting.16 And, he had
also come across Absolutism in Borelli’s De vi percussionis of 1667. To
Huygens, Newton’s case in the Scholium appeared as a late restatement of
an old view—a mistaken one, he thought—updated just by the addition of
the globes scenario. Huygens’s real target was not Absolute Space but Com-
pletism, and he rebuffed all natural philosophy—Aristotelian and early mod-
ern, astronomy and dynamics—for its presumption that bodies have true
motions. From that angle, Newton ðwho assumed itÞ was just one among
many, and Huygens mentions him as an afterthought. “It is commonly be-
lieved that there is some truemotion, as opposed to relative. Borelli,Mariotte.
Maybe Pardies too? Newton thinks so. Wallis, perhaps? . . . Thus believe all
of them; and also Newton,” Huygens asserts ðv.E, x.28rÞ. This myth about
Huygens is as false as the first, then.17
Finally, a corollary of my interpretation is that Earman’s statement of
relationism is insufficient in two respects. First, it cannot distinguish T-
Relationism from Relativism, two distinct theses, logically and historically.
R1 fails to make conceptual room for the ðearly modernÞ view that some rel-
ative motions are preferred: many canonical figures denied absolute space
and yet asserted that there is a fact about whether the earth, the sun, and the
15. Recall as well his charge that Huygens failed to explain relative to what a force-free
body moves in straight lines. This too is unfounded. As I explained, they are straight
relative to some arbitrary H-frame.
16. Examples are too many to cite. For context, see Mormino ð1993Þ, 54–55.
17. Vilain ð1996Þ and Chareix ð2006Þ also frame Huygens’s doctrine in terms of a
supposed engagement with Newton, as do nearly all Anglophone commentators.
296 MARIUS STAN
This content downloaded from 136.167.003.036 on March 12, 2016 06:01:34 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
stars truly move.18 Second, R1 fails to specify whether it means ‘motion’ as
strictly actual kinematic change or it allows latent change as well. As we
saw, Huygens uses ‘relative motion’ to cover latent motions too. R1 should
not dismiss that as confused or wrong. For one, L-motion has a well-defined
correlate, L-rest.19 And physical insight supports it: after all, some motions
are free, and some are constrained. For another, Huygens is not alone in
thinking that L-motion was legitimately relative motion. Kant too analyzed
rigid spin as L-motion of the parts relative to each other ðStan 2015Þ. These
facts warrant a reassessment and a more fine-grained reformulation of
Earman’s R1.
8. Conclusion. I have made a sustained case for Huygens’s deep insight
into the kinematic content of classical mechanics. Among the early mod-
erns, he saw further than anyone how to articulate mechanical foundations
without a concept of true motion. And, he grasped that the phenomena of
rotation are not conclusive evidence for absolute space because they can be
explained without it. His alternative to Newton is as ingenious as it is de-
fensible. Thenwe have cause to regret that it remained historically inert. Had
Huygens overcome his proverbial reluctance to publish—and had Newton
made hisDe gravitatione public—a profound philosophical exchangewould
have started 2 centuries before the late modern debates in the twilight of
classical physics.
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